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Substance Over Form: The Mississippi Supreme Court Overcomes Semantic Problems in Causation Testimony -Pittman
v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984).
FACTS OF THE CASE

On December 4, 1980, Joseph R. Hodges' brought a malpractice suit against Dr. Harrison V. Pittman, a Yazoo City dentist.
Hodges' claim arose out of allegedly negligent treatment he had
earlier received from Dr. Pittman. The treatment involved the
removal of two "wisdom" teeth from Hodges' lower jaw. Shortly
after the operation, Hodges complained of a numbness in his chin
and lower lip which continued for several months. Hodges filed
suit against Dr. Pittman claiming that the numbness was permanent in nature and due to the negligent treatment he had received
from Dr. Pittman. After hearing testimony from both sides, the
jury returned a verdict in favor of Hodges and assessed damages
at $20,000.
On appeal, Dr. Pittman claimed that there was no competent
evidence to submit to the jury that his negligence, if any, was
the proximate cause of Hodges' injury.2 The Mississippi Supreme
Court rejected this argument and affirmed the jury verdict. The
court held that the testimony of Hodges' expert witness was expressed in terms of reasonable medical probability even though
the expert had stated that, in his opinion, there were three possible causes of Hodges' nerve damage.'
BACKGROUND

The requirement that expert testimony regarding causation be
expressed in terms of probabilities in order to get the case before
1. Before the case came to trial, Hodges and his wife were divorced. Later, Hodges committed suicide.
The casewas revived in the name of Lindsey Hodges, his minor daughter. Tragically, Lindsey Hodges also
died and the suit was again revived, this time in the name of Linda Hodges, the mother and sole heir of Lindsey
Hodges. See Brief of Appellant at 1, Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984).
2. Pittman raised two other issues as well. First, he claimed that the action was barred by the two-year
statute of limitations under Miss. CODE ANN. § 15-1-36 (Supp. 1984). 462 So. 2d at 331-33. The court ruled
that the statute began to run when Hodges would have discovered, by the exercise of reasonable diligence,
that his numbness was present and that the action was brought within two years of this reasonable time. Id.
at 333. Second, Pittman claimed that the jury was not properly instructed regarding damages. Id. at 335-36.
The court dismissed this contention as well since Hodges failed to object to the instruction at trial. Id. at 336.
3. Dr. E.G. Mainous, plaintiffs expert witness, testified as follows:
There could be three possible causes of numbness. One, the - the nerve could have been damaged
during the surgical procedure. Two, the nerve could be damaged from exerting extreme pressure on
a material that does not change itsintensity when it's in the presence of a solution. And three, the
presence of infection secondary to a foreign body that doesn't resorb. Record at 143, Pittman.
Pittman, 462 So. 2d at 333.
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the jury is not a special standard that is confined to medical cases."
It is a basic legal principle that the plaintiff must prove causation
in negligence cases.' A plaintiff must submit evidence that provides a reasonable basis for a jury determination that it was more
probable than not that the defendant's negligence was the cause
of the resulting harm or injury. 6 A mere possibility of causation
is not enough. When the issue is left to surmise or conjecture,
a jury question has not been presented."
As courts have often noted, it is usually difficult to determine
whether a sufficient showing has been made to warrant submission of the causation issue to the jury.' Mississippi does, however,
have a vast number of cases which address this issue." Over fifty
years ago, the Mississippi Supreme Court stated in Berryhill v.
Nichols"° that medical testimony to the effect that an injury could
possibly have resulted from an alleged cause is not substantial
evidence and thus, will not support a verdict." In Scott County
Co-op v. Brown," the plaintiffs expert witness stated that the plaintiffs mental condition could have been caused by a previous accident. The court ruled that this testimony only showed a mere
possibility of causation." Similarly, in Kramer Service, Inc. v.
Wilkins,"' a personal injury action, the plaintiff contended that skin
cancer had resulted from an injury that he had received two years
earlier. One physician testified that there was one chance in one
hundred that the cancer had resulted from the earlier injury, while
another physician testified that no connection existed between the
cancer and the injury. Recognizing that the combined testimony
of the two physicians suggested that there was only a remote possibility that the cancer had resulted from the earlier injury, the
court ruled that the jury should not have been allowed to consider the issue.'"
Mutual Ben. Health and Accident Ass'n v. Johnson6 also illustrates what constitutes insufficient medical testimony in Missis4. See, e.g., John Morrell & Company v. Shultz, 208 So. 2d 906, 907 (Miss. 1968); Illinois Central Railroad Company v. Cathey, 70 Miss. 332, 338, 12 So. 253, 254 (1892).
5. See W. PROSSER& W. KEETON, PROSSERAND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS § 41 at 269 (5th ed.
1984); 57 Ass. JUR. 2D Negligence § 128 (1971).
6. W. PROSSER, § 41 at 269.
7. Id.
8. See, e.g., Lenger v. Physician's General Hospital, 455 S.W.2d 703, 706 (Tex. 1970).
9. See infra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
10. 171 Miss. 769, 158 So. 470 (1935).
11. Id. at 773-74, 158 So. at 471.
12. 187 So. 2d 321 (Miss. 1966).
13. Id. at 326.
14. 184 Miss. 483, 186 So. 625 (1939).
15. Id. at 496, 186 So. at 627.
16. 186 So. 297 (Miss. 1939).
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sippi. In Johnson, a suit on an accident insurance policy, the
insured had gone out to feed the 'hogs when he slipped on the icy
ground. As he fell, one of the buckets he was carrying struck him
on the cheek near the nose. Several days later the insured died
of cavernous sinus thrombosis. The beneficiary, in an effort to
recover under the policy, tried to establish a causal relation
between the blow to the cheek and the infection in the nose that
had led to the insured's death. However, the physicians who testified were able to state only that the blow could possibly have
caused the infection. The court ruled that this testimony was insufficient to establish a jury question as it left the jury to conjecture as to the cause of the infection. 7 Numerous other Mississippi
cases have repeated the principle that mere possibilities will not
sustain a verdict.1 "
The required standard of sufficiency for expert testimony was
made clear in Garrettv. Wade19 when the court stated that medical testimony is not probative unless it is expressed in terms of
probabilities and not possibilities."0 Under the language of Garrett, a medical expert has to testify that the injury was probably
caused by the defendant's conduct. Garrettdoes not require an
expert to testify with absolute certainty. The court observed in
City of Jackson v. Locklar "1that whenever facts are in dispute
or the evidence is such that fairminded men may draw different
inferences, a measure of speculation and conjecture will be
allowed.22
Mississippi's application of the probability standard in cases involving expert medical testimony is supported by a substantial
majority of American jurisdictions.' Even Alabama, a state which
recognizes the scintilla rule of evidence," follows the probability
17. Id. at 298.
18. See, e.g., Garrett v. Wade, 259 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1972); John Morrell and Company v. Shultz, 208
So. 2d 906 (Miss. 1968); Teche Lines, Inc. v. Bounds, 182 Miss. 638, 179 So. 747 (1938).
19. 259 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1972).
20. Id. at 479.
21. 431 So. 2d 475 (Miss. 1983).
22. Id. at 478; see also Jesco, Inc. v. Shannon, 451 So. 2d 694, 700 (Miss. 1984); Gulf Insurance Co.
v. Provine, 321 So. 2d 311, 314 (Miss. 1975).
23. See, e.g., Pappa v. Bonner, 268 Ala. 185, 105 So. 2d 87 (1958); Seaton v. Rosenberg, 573 S.W.2d
333 (Ky. 1978); Walker V. Marcev, 427 So. 2d 678 (La. App. 1983); Johnesee v. Stop & Shop Companies,
174 N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 426, 416 A.2d 956 (1980); Matott v. Ward, 48 N.Y.2d 455, 399 N.E.2d 532,
423 N.Y.S.2d 645 (1979); Lenger v. Physician's General Hospital, 455 S.W.2d 703 (Tex. 1970); Spruill v.
Commonwealth, 221 Va. 475, 271 S.E.2d 419 (1980); Hovermale v. Berkeley Springs Moose Lodge, 165
W. Va. 689, 271 S.E.2d 335 (1980); see also 7 J. WIoMol, EVIDENCE IN TIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1976
(1979 & Supp. 1984).
24. Black defines a "scintilla of evidence" as follows:
A spark of evidence. A metaphorical expression to describe a very insignificant or trifling item or
particle of evidence; used in the statement of the common-law rule that if there is any evidence at
all in a case, even a mere scintilla, tending to support a material issue, the case cannot be taken from
the jury, but must be left to their decision.
BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY 1207 (5th ed. 1979).
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standard in malpractice cases." It is difficult, however, to see how
the probability standard and the scintilla rule can coexist. 6
Although the vast majority of states do follow the probability
standard, 2 ' some courts apply a more exacting rule. Pennsylvania courts have held that an expert must testify that the plaintiffs
condition did result from the cause alleged. 8 According to the
Pennsylvania Supreme Court, medical testimony that an injury
or condition was probably caused by the defendant is not competent evidence to prove causation. "9
An early Louisiana case, Olsen v. Texas Co."0 also held that
evidence as to probabilities is insufficient to establish liability.
The Louisiana court ruled that the plaintiff must make his case
certain, not just probable. 1 The Louisiana court has since relaxed
this standard, stating that proof is sufficient when the fact or causation is more probable than not."2
At the opposite end of the spectrum are the courts which have
upheld the use of expert testimony stated in terms of possibilities
to establish causation if the testimony is buttressed by other evidence or circumstances which show that a causal relationship
exists. In Esmonde v. Lima Locomotive Works,33 an Ohio case,
the medical expert testified that the plaintiff could have been injured in a certain manner. While the court recognized that this
testimony is by itself insufficient to support a verdict, other evi25. Waddell v. Jordan, 293 Ala. 256, 302 So. 2d 74 (1974); Pappa v. Bonner, 268 Ala. 185, 105 So.
2d 87 (1958).
26. The scintilla rule allows the jury to consider the issue even if only a trifle or small particle of evidence
has been presented. See BLACK'S LAW DICTIONARY, supra note 24, at 1207. The probability standard calls
for more substantial evidence. Alabama courts do not seem concerned with this conceptual problem. See, e.g.,
Pappa v. Bonner, 268 Ala. 185, 188, 105 So. 2d 87, 90 (1958):
There must be some evidence to the effect that such negligence probably caused the injury .... However,
this does not eliminate the effect of Alabama's "scintilla" rule. If there is a scintilla of evidence that
the negligence complained of probably caused the injury[,] there is presented a question of fact for
the jury's determination.
The Mississippi Supreme Court, like this writer, has had trouble with the coexistence of these seemingly mutually exclusive concepts. See, e.g., Mutual Ben. Health & Accident Ass'n v. Johnson, 186 So. 297, 298 (Miss.
1939).
27. See supra note 23.
28. McMahon v. Young, 442 Pa. 484, 276 A.2d 534 (1971); Menarde v. Philadelphia Transp. Co., 376
Pa. 497, 103 A.2d 681 (1954).
29. McMahon, 442 Pa. at 486, 276 A.2d at 535. The Pennsylvania court offered the following rationale
for its strict standard:
Perhaps in the world of medicine nothing is absolutely certain. Nevertheless, doctors must make decisions in their own profession every day based on their own expert opinions. Physicians must understand that it is the intent of our law that if the plaintiffs medical expert cannot form an opinion with
sufficient certainty so as to make a medical judgment, there is nothing on the record with which a
jury can make a decision with sufficient certainty so as to make a legal judgment.
Id.
30. 161 So. 219 (La. App. 1935).
31. Id. at 220.
32. See, e.g., Jordan v. Travelers Ins. Co., 257 La. 995, 1008, 245 So. 2d 151, 155 (1971).
33. 51 Ohio App. 454, 1 N.E.2d 633 (1935).
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dence, taken together with the medical testimony, warranted submission of the issue to the jury."4
In addition to these preceding standards, some courts require
only that an expert testify with a "reasonable degree of medical
certainty"; however, this standard has been construed in a variety of ways. Pennsylvania courts use this standard and construe
it to mean something close to virtual certainty." Mississippi uses
this standard only as a means of determining whether the probability standard has been met. 6 Wisconsin considers "medical certainty" and "medical probability" to be synonymous. 3 '
As the preceding discussion has illustrated, all courts agree that
the plaintiff must prove causation. 8 It is the standard to be used
to determine whether causation has been adequately proven that
sends the courts in different directions. Even though most jurisdictions follow the probability standard, 9 they often disagree upon
what constitutes a probability or what test is to be used to determine whether the probability standard has been met.4"
Pittman v. Hodges
The plaintiffs expert witness in Pittman testified that there were
three possible causes of the nerve damage.41 The defendant, in
reaction to this testimony, asked for a peremptory instruction contending that this testimony amounted to a mere possibility of causation and, therefore, was incompetent to prove proximate cause. '
The circuit court denied this request. 3
Citing Garrettv. Wade"4 as authority, Dr. Pittman claimed on
appeal that the lower court erred in denying the requested instruction.4" Upon affirming the circuit court's ruling on this issue, the
court stated that the meaning of an expert's answer that there could
be three possible causes of the numbness should be considered
in light of his testimony on each of these causes. The court looked
34. For more cases illustrating this view, see generally Annot., 135 A.L.R. 516, 532 (1941).
35. See, e.g., Hamil v. Bashline, 481 Pa. 256, 392 A.2d 1280 (1978).
36. See, e.g., Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330, 335 (Miss. 1984) ("Taken as a whole, Dr. Mainous's
testimony ... expressed an opinion based upon a reasonable degree of medical certainty in terms of medical
probability that the numbness of Hodges was caused by the actions of Dr. Pittman ... .
37. See Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971).
38. See supra notes 4-7 and accompanying text.
39. See supra note 23.
40. See generally, Markius, Semantics of Traumatic Causation, 12 CLEV.-MAR. L. REv. 233 (1963); Annot. 135 A.L.R. 516 (1941).
41. See supra note 3.
42. Record at 261, Pitoman.
43. Id.
44. 259 So. 2d 476 (Miss. 1972).
45. Brief for Appellant at 10-11, Pittman v. Hodges, 462 So. 2d 330 (Miss. 1984).

MISSISSIPPI COLLEGE LAW REVIEW

[VOL. 6:111

to see whether the expert considered the numbness a possible result
of one of the three causes or a probable result of Dr. Pittman's
treatment as a whole with three alternative explanations for the
numbness experienced by Hodges. 6
After discussing the medical testimony regarding each possible cause at some length," 7 the court opted for the latter view.
The court concluded that the expert had expressed an opinion in
terms of medical probability that Dr. Pittman had breached the
standard of care and that this breach was the proximate cause of
the plaintiffs injury."' The court apparently adopted the position
that the three alternative possibilities were only explanations for
the numbness.
ANALYSIS

Since it is clear that the Mississippi court has rejected testimony by medical experts phrased in terms of possibilities,49 the question arises as to what specific wording an expert witness must
use in order to meet the probability standard. Are there "magic
words" an expert must say in order for his testimony to pass
evidentiary muster? Or does the court weigh all of the expert's
testimony and make an independent determination as to whether
the testimony amounts to a probability or a mere possibility?
In Segar v. Garan, Inc.," a workmen's compensation case, the
Mississippi court confronted these questions and stated that "[t]he
distinction between probability and possibility should not follow
too slavishly the witnesses' choice of words," "' and that
[t]he compensation process is not a game of 'say the magic word,' in which the rights of
injured workers should depend on whether a witness happens to choose a form of words
prescribed by a court or legislature. What counts is the real substance of what the witness
intended to convey .... 52

Although the court did not rely on Segar in Pittman v. Hodges,
it was this principle of "substance over form" that confronted the
court.
Hodges' expert witness testified as to possible causes; he never
stated that any particular one of the alternative causes probably
caused the numbness.53 However, he did say that each of these
alleged causes constituted a deviation from the standard of care.5"
46. Piuman, 462 So. 2d at 334.
47. Id. at 334-35.

48. Id. at 335.
49.
50.
51.
52.
53.
54.

See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
388 So. 2d 165 (Miss. 1980).
Id. 3 A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WOuMEN'S COMPENSATION, § 80.32 at 15-435 (1976).
Id. 3 A. LARSON, § 80.32(d) at 15-460-61 (1976).
See supra note 3.
Record at 141-54, Piuman.
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The court examined all of this testimony and ruled that taken as
a whole it amounted to an opinion based upon reasonable medical probabilities."5 Thus, just as in Segar, the substance of the
expert's testimony prevailed over the form of the words he used.
Had the court focused exclusively on the expert's use of the phrase
"possible causes" a different result would have been reached."'
Examining the substance of an expert's testimony rather than
the particular words he uses is a sound approach because it keeps
a negligent defendant from escaping liability due to the fact that
he has breached the standard of care in so many ways that an expert is unable to pinpoint with certainty which breach actually
caused the injury." ' Use of the "substance" standard helps to close
semantic loopholes.
As words often mean different things to different people," examining testimony by its substance keeps the court from having
to decide what an expert means when he uses words or phrases
that could mean either "possible" or "probable". For example, if
a physician testifies that it is his opinion that the plaintiffs condition "very possibly" was caused by the defendant's act, would this
mean that he thinks the defendant possibly caused or probably
caused the injury? It all turns on how one interprets the phrase
"very possibly." To some it may mean "possible" and to others
it may mean "probable." 9
Another semantic problem occurs because physicians and at-

55. Piutman, 462 So. 2d at 335.
56. See supra notes 10-18 and accompanying text.
57. That the Mississippi court recognized this is evidenced by the folowing quote from Pinman, 462 So.
2d at 335: "There is no merit to the slightly ironic argument that more than one breach of the standard of care
casts doubt upon D,-. Pittman's liability and entitles him to an exemption from the scrutiny of the jury."
58. As Justice Halmes observed in Towne v. Eisner, 245 U.S. 418, 425 (1918): "A word is not a crystal,
transparent and unchanged, it is the skin of a living thought and may vary greatly in color and content according to the circumsta ices and the time in which it is used." Chief Justice Marshall made a similar observation
in McCulloch v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316, 414 (1819): "Such is the character of human language,
that no word conveys to the mind, in all situations, one single definitive idea .
Justice Frankfurter approached the problem from a practical standpoint:
[E]xactness in te use of words is the basis of all serious thinking. You will get nowhere without it.
Words are clumsy tools, and it is very easy to cut one's fingers with them, and they need the closest
attention in han ling; but they are the only tools we have, and imagination itself cannot work without
them. You mus- master the use of them, or you will wander forever guessing at the mercy of mere
impulse and um ecognized assumptions and arbitrary associations, carried away with every wind of
doctrine.
F. FRANKFURTER, OF LAW AND MEN: PAPERSAND ADDRESSES
OF FELIX FRANKFURTER 70-71 (1956) (quoting
Allen, Essay on Jermy Bentham, in THE SOCIAL AND POLITICAL IDEAS OF THE REVOLUTIONARY ERA, 181,
99 (Hearnshaw ed. 1931)).
59. E.g., in In Ihterest of Watson, 5 Kan. App. 2d 277, 281, 615 P.2d 801, 805 (1980), the court observed: "Here, in spite of the fact that the word 'possibility' was used, the fact that the witness stated that the
possibility was 'very, very strong' indicates that she was thinking and speaking in terms of probability."
For examples of o her "borderline" phrases that have posed problems see Wray v. Schwitzer Co., 615 S.W.2d
646 (Mo. App. 198 1) (expert used terms "think," "guess," "rough opinion," and "impression."); Dickinson v.
Mailliard, 175 N.W. 2d 588 (Iowa 1970) (expert's opinion was couched in such terms as "I think" and "I believe").
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torneys have differing interpretations of the word "cause." 6 o To
an attorney, it is a word of special legal significance as it is an
essential element of proof in a negligence action.61 To a physician, causation refers to developments inside a patient's body which
produce medical problems.6" The doctor's definition of "cause"
is much more demanding and restrictive than the lawyer's definition.6
Thus, when a physician is asked whether a particular event probably caused the plaintiffs medical problem, he may be hesitant
to speak with certainty because medicine is an inexact science in
which anything is possible.6' The physician may be reluctant to
answer with the word "probable," yet it is that very word which
the law requires.' When a court looks at the substance of medical testimony it alleviates much of this problem.66
Since the Mississippi court looked to the substance over the form
of the testimony in Pittman, the question arises as to whether the
court will use this same approach in the future. While the substantive approach seems to be the better reasoned one, it is inconsistent with earlier Mississippi cases. In Garrettthe court was
very concerned with the precise wording, not the substantive testimony, of the expert witness.67 The same was true in Scott County
Co-op, where although the court said that it had based its decision upon a "careful reading of all of [the doctor's] testimony,"68
the court was again caught up in the exact words used by the expert. 69 Pittman should mark the end of the strict, term-oriented
view.
Mississippi has not been alone in its preoccupation with precise wording; other courts have also required precise use of specific words. In Pucci v. Rausch° the Wisconsin court outlined which
60. M. HOUTS, 1 LAWYER'S GUIDE TO MEDICAL PROOF (MB) § 102.15 (June, 1984).
61. See supra note 5 and accompanying text; see also HouTs, supra note 59, at § 102.15(1).
62. HouTs, supra note 60, at § 102.15(1).
63. Id. at § 102.15(2)-(3) ("The doctor thinks of proving medical causation in terms of identifying a specific
causative agent by trial and error, testing and retesting, experiment after experiment, until there can be no
practical doubt but that Item A produces Disease B ....").
64. McMahon, 442 Pa. at 486, 276 A.2d at 535. ("Perhaps in the world of medicine nothing is absolutely
certain."); see also Pucci v. Rausch, 51 Wis. 2d 513, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971) ("Dr. Peterson countered that
'Everything in medicine is speculative; there is nothing that is not speculative.'" ). Id. at 518, 187 N.W.2d at 141.
65. This reluctance of physicians to testify with certainty is compounded by the fact that "the more distinguished a medical witness is, the more tentative and qualified are his statements on the witness stand." 3 A.
LARSON, § 80.32 at 15-435-36 (1976).
66. In light of the semantic problems that occur when the expert is forced to use certain terms like "probable," the substantive approach provides needed flexibility.
67. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
68. 187 So. 2d at 326.
69. Id. (The court was quick to point out that the expert had used the phrases "very likely" and "could have
been" when he testified on the causation issue.).
70. 51 Wis. 2d 513, 187 N.W.2d 138 (1971.)
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specific words and phrases constituted a possibility and which ones
constituted a probability. The court actually stated which words
would and would not indicate the required degree of medical certainty. " ThiS approach seems to put the law back into the stage
of formalism which Cardozo proclaimed had already passed.72
Another writer criticized the "magic word" approach when he
stated, "The use or absence of particular key words should be no
basis, standing alone, to authorize submission of the case to the
jury or to refuse its consideration by the jury." ' According to
this same writer, courts use the "magic word" approach because,
"[ilt is far simpler for a reviewing court to look for the magical
word or phrase, in deciding whether a case was presented for the
jury, than to make a careful analysis of all the testimony, including the medical testimony." 7
Again, the use of expert medical testimony is not a word game
that is won onrly when the expert says the magic word. Mississippi has come to realize this as evidenced by the Pittman and Segar
decisions. Scveral other jurisdictions have also begun to put less
emphasis on the exact words used by a medical expert and more
emphasis on the substance of his testimony."5 These decisions,'
along with F'ittman and Segar, have indeed kept the word from
becoming "the sovereign talisman where every slip is fatal.""'
Use of the "substance" standard of examining expert medical
testimony as a whole does not displace the probability standard;
it merely changes the way that a court determines whether the
probability standard has been met."8 The emphasis moves from
formalism to, substance.
71. The Wisconsia court stated:
"Might" or "couli" is not sufficient and does not reach the certitude required. The "might or could
rule" is another form of possibility like "perhaps." However, an opinion expressed in terms of "I feel"
or "I believe" ha. been held to be sufficient. The words "liable," "likely," and "probable" have also
been accepted as words connoting reasonable probability as opposed to a possibility (citations omitted).
Id. at519, 187 N.W.2d at 142.
72. Wood v. Lucy, Lady Duff-Gordon, 222 N.Y. 88, 90-91, 118 N.E. 214, 214 (1917).
73. Markus, supra note 40, at 245.
74. Id. at 242.
1972), where the court stated:
75. See Norland v Washington General Hospital, 461 F.2d 694, 697 (8th Cir.
The use of the ter rns 'probable' and 'possible' as a basis for testing of qualification or lack of qualification in respect to a medical opinion has frequently converted this aspect of trial into a mere semantic
ritual or hassle." The court has "come to recognize that the competency of a doctor's testimony cannot
soundly be permitted to turn on a mechanical rule of law as to which of the terms he has employed.
Id; see also Miller v. National Cabinet Co., 8 N.Y.2d 277, 282, 168 N.E.2d 811, 813, 204 N.Y.S.2d 129,
132-33 (1960) ("The probative force of an Jexpert) opinion is not to be defeated by Semantics... ."); Insurance
Co. of North Amerirt, v. Meyers, 411 S.W.2d 710, 713 (Tex. 1966) ("Reasonable probability, in turn, is determinable by conside ration of the substance of the testimony of the expert witness and does not turn on semantics or on the use by the witness of any particular phrase or term.").
76. See Norland, .161 F.2d 694 (8th Cir. 1972); Miller, 8 N.Y.2d 277, 168 N.E.2d 811, 204 N.Y.S.2d
129 (1960); Meyers, 411 S.W.2d 710 (Tex. 1966).
77. Wood, 222 N Y. at 90-91, 118 N.E. at 214.
78. See, e.g., Meyer, 411 S.W.2d at 713; Markus, supra note 40, at 245. Of course the probability standard must be retained or else juries would resort to conjecture.
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CONCLUSION

It has long been settled that expert testimony must be expressed
in terms of probabilities, not possibilities, in order to be probative. In Pittman v. Hodges the expert had testified only as to possible causes. Instead of summarily dismissing the testimony for
failure to use the right term, the Mississippi court recognized that
the substance of the expert testimony amounted to a probability
even though it was expressed in terms of possibilities and upheld
the testimony as sufficient evidence of causation. In so ruling the
court moved beyond formalism by keeping a plaintiffs right of
recovery from depending on the precise words used by an expert
witness.
Michael Parker

